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Changing Relations: Power, Ethics and Responsibility
In Graduate Supervision
Valerie-Lee Chapman
Thomas J. Sork
The University of British Columbia
Abstract: This paper continues the dialogue between a feminist
graduate student and non-feminist male advisor in an adult
education graduate program: they each define the power
relations inherent in the relationship, and raise questions about
their ethical and moral responsibilities.

About a year ago we began talking about our relationship. Some of the dialogue centred on our
feelings of discomfort, annoyance and difference from the other. Other discussions centred on
the power relations between us, how gender affected our relationship, what personal,
professional and political expectations we had for each other, and what ethical stances we
brought to the relationship. We realised just how fundamentally opposed were our
epistemological, methodological and ontological views.
We have since discovered that while there is much discussion of these issues from a theoretical
perspective there is less empirical data. So while the student-advisor relationship is the heart of
the graduate education experience, it is rarely used as a site for the analysis of what Tisdell
(1993) has called interlocking systems of power, privilege and oppression in adult higher
education. In this paper we continue our dialogue, talking about one of the practices that can
either reproduce or challenge the structured power relations of higher education—the scholarship
game.
Operating from different ethical perspectives of care, of justice and of duty, and how they frame
our purposes and our roles and responsibilities to each other and to the institution, we have come
to see how differently we view adult education. Valerie, the feminist student, believes strongly
that the ethical role of adult educators is to create environments where people can surface just
how the social and material reality of their lives is constructed in unequal power relationships
based on gender, race, class, ability and sexual orientation (Cunningham, 1988). Tom, the
supervisor, on the other hand, believes adult educators may be guided by other, equally valid,
moral imperatives. Will this relationship ever work?

Tom says…
Valerie and I have talked about "power" on many occasions, but only recently have we begun to
explore more fully what each of us means when we use the word. We both recognize that we are

in an asymmetrical power relationship in which I am the more powerful partner. Valerie has
voiced her desire for power to be "shared" which to me presupposes that we have the option to
decide to make the relationship more symmetrical. My first response to this was that the power I
possess as a faculty member can’t be "shared" in the conventional sense because it is largely a
function of the structure of the university, including how decisions are made about key events in
the lives of students. There are many structural features of this university that reflect and
reproduce the power imbalances that exist between faculty and students—even advanced
doctoral students, some of whom are preparing to enter the professorate.
This year and last Valerie asked me to write letters of reference on her behalf for several
fellowship competitions. The fact that she had to ask and that I had the option to do it or not
reflects this imbalance in power. Valerie is experienced in these games and has done her best to
coach me in what she regards as important information to include in the letters. I sense that she is
aware of how such coaching can backfire if I regard it as too insistent or directive. As is usually
the case, these letters are regarded as "confidential" which I have always interpreted to mean that
they are not shown to the student or to others who are outside the decision making process. In
one conversation this fall, Valerie asked if I would be giving her a copy of the letter I wrote. She
indicated that another faculty member had done so and that she—Valerie—had found it helpful
to know what was said in the letter. My response was, "No…I don’t do that." I explained that if I
provided a copy for one student, I would feel morally obligated to provide copies to all those
who ask for references. If I provided copies of letters to the students concerned, then I would not
feel as free to provide a candid assessment of each person’s strengths and weaknesses. This
leaves Valerie—and other students—guessing about what I said in my letter and not knowing
whether I helped or hindered their chances of getting access to important resources.
If I think about this example using a common sense notion of power, I can see why the
asymmetrical character of our relationship is so troubling and why "sharing" power could be
desirable. The fact that I can write whatever I want in these letters and students will not have any
recourse is morally troubling. I have an ethical obligation to the adjudication committees for
these awards to provide an accurate and complete assessment and I also have an obligation to the
student to not jeopardize her or his chances of getting support by submitting an overly negative
or sloppy letter. I have heard that some students hold the view that if the letter can’t be a glowing
endorsement, then I shouldn’t agree to write a letter at all. I don’t accept this view, but knowing
that it is "out there" has caused me to think more carefully about accepting invitations to provide
a reference. I have also thought about what sort of process would reflect a more balanced power
relationship while at the same allow me to fulfil my ethical obligations to adjudication
committees and sponsors.
I did a literature search for publications that addressed the power relations involved in graduate
education—particularly in the research supervision process. It was interesting to note that one
recent study (Aguinis, Nesler, Quigley, Lee and Tedeschi, 1996) directly on the topic used a very
old taxonomy of power developed by French and Raven (1959). Aguinis et al argue that "The
French and Raven power taxonomy is especially relevant to the study of supervising professorstudent power interactions because it is a theory of power that applies to dyadic relationships"
(p. 271). Following are the five types of power as they apply to the faculty/student relationship:

Coercive power—the ability of a faculty member to "punish" the
student if the student does not conform in ways regarded as
acceptable by the faculty member (p. 157-158).
Reward power—the ability of one person to mediate rewards for
another. In a faculty/student relationship the faculty member may
provide or withhold rewards to the student in order to shape the
student’s behavior in a way considered acceptable by the faculty
member (p. 156-157).
Legitimate power—stems from values held by the student which
dictate that the faculty member has a legitimate right to influence
the student and that the student has a sense of obligation to accept
this influence (p. 159).
Referent power—based on the identification of the student with the
faculty member, what the authors refer to as "a feeling of oneness"
or a desire for such an identity (p. 161). Referent power would be
strong if the student felt a high degree of identification with the
faculty member, or with becoming a faculty member.
Expert power—based on the perception that the faculty member
"has some special knowledge or expertness" (p. 156). "The range
of expert power…is more delimited than that of referent power.
Not only is it restricted to cognitive systems but the expert is seen
as having superior knowledge or ability in very specific areas, and
his [sic] power will be limited to these areas…" (p. 164).
Although somewhat dated and possibly overly psychological, I thought these distinctions were
potentially useful for discussing our relationship because they would allow us to talk about
power more concretely. For example, the process of students requesting letters of reference and
faculty members agreeing to write them seems ripe for analysis using some of the distinctions
above. What forms of power do students believe that faculty possess that leads them to ask
faculty for references? How do students expect these perceived forms of power to play out when
reference letters are read by members of adjudication committees? What happens to a student’s
view of faculty power when the student does not receive financial support? And is the
French/Raven taxonomy useful in any way when the notion of "sharing power" is discussed?
After reading the 1996 article and the original French and Raven chapter, Valerie did not initially
accept either as helpful in part because the studies seemed overly "masculinist" and took no
account of gender, race, class and other differences. She was also suspicious of the taxonomy
because it did not address these issues.
The exchange over this research was another—dare I say—predictable outcome of two people
working together who bring to the collaboration two very different perspectives on what
constitutes legitimate or useful knowledge. Yet I worry about her quick rejection of recent

research based on the gender of its authors and the assumption that taxonomies are inherently
limiting. There is not much research that we could find that is directly on the subject of
faculty/graduate student relationships, so it seems to me that everything that has been done in the
past 5 years deserves a careful look.
Shortly after this, Valerie gave me some material that provides a feminist analysis of Foucault’s
notion of power-knowledge (McNeil, 1993). Although this piece is engaging and provocative, I
have yet to see how it can be used to deepen our analysis. It does provide an orientation to
discourse analysis as a means of uncovering power relations, so maybe this reflexive process we
are engaged in is a perfect illustration of a discourse-in-need-of-deconstruction. We seem to be
attempting to influence the direction of our collaboration by proposing literature that we each
feel most comfortable with. Our collaboration is forcing us to read literature—both masculinist
and feminist—that we might not otherwise be inclined to explore and in that way it is beneficial
to me. I wonder if Valerie feels the same way?

Valerie says…
I’ve spent the last two and a half months writing scholarship applications. Over and over and
over. I have re-arranged words, deconstructed language, read between, under, behind and on top
of the lines of instructions, written what I want, what "they" want and what I don’t want. But
hardest of all is the begging of references. I don’t choose that word, begging, lightly. The most
difficult references to ask for are the ones from people who know you the best—like Tom, my
supervisor. I know that, even though our relationship has improved over the last two years, this is
one of the areas where the differences between us are most acute. I want to stereotype and say,
Oh, that must be a male thing, or, Well, typical of the old academy! He’s amenable at times to
suggestion, but then I feel I am acting out the typical Woman stereotype—manipulating the
honest, bluff, open Man, using my feminine wiles to get what I want from Him. Like all
stereotypes, there’s enough recognisability to make it disquieting, and again, typically, we both
seem to look only for confirming evidence for our stereotypical views on blind white males and
deaf feminists (Griffiths, 1995).
Too often these last months I’ve felt as if I’m trespassing on sacred academic ground with him—
this far, and no further! I still believe there’s a possibility for collaboration, for a sharing of
power, for joint decisions on who is responsible for what in my graduate education, and for an
understanding between us that the relationship will not be about abusing that shared power, but
about a moral and ethical sense of caring. And not that stereotypical feminine ‘caring’—he’s the
one with the kids, family, even a dog, all that, not me. If anyone fits the nurturer stereotype, it’s
much more likely to be him than me. But this reference business brings up so much of the old
hashed over stuff, feminist stuff, gendered stuff—much easier to do without it, but it persists in
coming back in to our relationship. So...
About begging. I have knocked on doors, sent emails, faxes and made phone-calls, I’ve also been
debating with myself, and fellow students, about just what makes a good reference and just what
part a good reference plays in a good (read, winning) application. What student has not known

the agony of asking, nicely, Would you give me a reference for a SSHRCC, UGF, or whatever,
and really wanted to say, So, Prof, is it going to be a good reference, or are you going to give me
the kiss of death letter? And who dares ask to see the reference when it’s written? Well, I did
ask... ouch. I read in the small print of the SSHRCC that under the Freedom of Information Act,
candidates can see their references, but really, who in their right mind would demand that? Only
someone who had won? There’s no way I’ll ask Tom again. So, I may not know what a good
reference is, but I’ve come to the conclusion that this scholarship game is the best example of a
discourse in effect that I have come across in a long time.
Foucault’s definition of discourses as being both historical and specific of certain knowledges
and the truths that come from them—what we can speak about in specific times and spaces—fit
the scholarship-application process to a ‘t’. He says, "It is in discourse that power and knowledge
are joined together"; he goes on, "discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but
also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it" (1990, p.
100-1). Here I am more inclined to agree with bell hooks, who wrote that subverting dominant
forms, undermining them, "happens much more easily in the realm of ‘texts’ than in the world of
human interaction...in which such moves challenge, disrupt, threaten, where repression is real"
(1990, p. 22.) Indeed. I would love to subvert the process, but how?
If discourses are enabling as well as constraining, then perhaps we should be using then more
creatively, watching how we build our world with them, and then mutating them, just a little,
making not-quite-new discourses fit old power structures. Subtly, planting notions, cultivating
new discourses… How about one where professor and student write a letter together? But...
This is how the supervision/power relations process works along side the scholarship one.
Actually, it’s all about relations, this scholarship game. It’s about how we want to define
ourselves as same or different from others/supervisors, about how power relations force both of
us to identify (or not) as same, not different. It’s about how we represent ourselves and how
others more powerful than us represent us. Above all, it’s about whether we’ve learned to
discipline ourselves well enough to be accepted in our disciplines, whether we’ve fitted ourselves
snugly enough into our places in the(ir) taxonomies and classificatory grids of education.
In the studies on supervision that Tom turned up, few, if any, of the researchers, asked questions
about how gender, race, class and sexual orientation—to name just a few post structural
‘variables’—affected the supervisory relationship. The discourses of masculinist scholarship and
research didn’t allow for that, yet it’s what most of us think about, privately. We just don’t speak
of it. In those same studies, none mention the material facts of power relations, even as they
define just what (they think) power is. And for feminists like me, it’s inconceivable to not start
there, with the assumption that you can’t "add in" power relations. Any description of any
relationship must begin with the fact that there exists an (often asymmetrical) power relation
between those in it. Starting with our "personal experience", or subject position, as we tend to
call it now, we must acknowledge that power relations exist. And especially in educational
relationships between teacher and learner, or supervisor and student.
Of course, Foucault (1990) believed that education was one of the "innumerable institutional
devices and discursive strategies" (p. 30) used to regulate populations and to control individuals.

But "power is only tolerable on condition that it masks a substantial part of itself" (p. 87). Power
is not a thing imposed from above, but something that works its way through all social
relations—and in the "internal discourses of the institution—the one it employ[s] to address
itself, and which circulate[s] among those who make it function". While I question the
consensual nature of power that marks Foucault’s thinking, I agree with him, that for power to
operate, "Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms... For it, secrecy is
not in the nature of an abuse, it is indispensable to its operation...perhaps just as indispensable to
those whom it dominates..." (p. 86). I support rendering power relations visible—at least an
admission that we do operate in a hierarchy of power relations, even if we do not want to disturb
it. And that that hierarchy is based on coercive power. Making power visible is about asking
awkward questions: Will I get a good reference, Why not, Have I been a good enough girl, Am I
ready yet, to be admitted further into your/this masculinist discipline?
I use the term ‘masculinist’ as meaning "work which, while claiming to be exhaustive, forgets
about women’s existence and concerns itself only with the position of men" (Le Doeuff, 1991, p.
18). Masculinism is apparent in the choice of topics for research, the way it writes up that
research in "unextravagant, unembellished, unpretentious, unexceptional, un(re)marked" ways
(Rose, 1993, p. 8), the way it assumes a rationality and knowledge as existing separate from
bodies, emotions, values, history, location—in all the discursive ways that signify that the
scholar of the university’s choice is the "master subject" (Haraway, 1991). He is white,
bourgeois, heterosexual and masculine.
The gender, race, class, etc., of the researchers in those studies didn’t affect their setting of
questions. It’s not necessary to be white, masculine, bourgeois, heterosexual. One can learn—
one must learn?—to be so constituted, or at least to represent oneself as the master
subject/scholar. To show, in writing up research, in choosing topics, in being referenced,
privately, in "good" letters, and publicly, in print, that one has mastered the discipline. Any
questions about this process must be neatly tidied away, left unsaid, along with the other
questions we don’t ask. …And in the end, as one professor told me, the deciding factor is getting
high-powered, over-the-top references. First, of course, you have to prove you belong, that you
are Same to their Same, that’s that referent power...
Ethically, what does it mean to pretend to be doing research you won’t do, to write differently
(don’t put any poems in, stay away from that post modern jargon and name dropping!) from your
usual style/of/life-/writing, to claim yourself as not what you really are (as if there were a real,
essential self... Ah, but there is, the master subject/self), to represent yourself falsely, in order to
succeed in the scholarship game of life? What does it say of our academic world that this is one
of the taken-for-granted rules of this discursive engagement, that we all know, are all complicit
with each other, that, Well, of course, that’s not really what I am going to do, say, be, but you
and I will just pretend.
Do we have a responsibility for our truth? Or is truth just the effect of power and knowledge,
flowing from diverse discourses? What would happen if we responsibly contested the
masculinist public performances of seminars, writing styles, fieldwork? If we contested the
private performances of masculinity? What would happen if I asked Tom, Let me see that
reference, And, Why don’t we re-write it, together? Or, if I went to the Head of the Scholarship

Committee, and said, Let me sit in on your SSHRCC deliberations—I want to know what my
ranking is, how you decided if I win or fail? What if we both went, or even five of us, or ten, or
twenty, faculty and students? Ah, but...
But for all our differences, both of us feel strongly that power is not entirely repressive, nor need
it be negative. Power can be productive. If it flows from one structure to another, if power
always creates resistance, then it can be turned around, taken up, used, to confront and change
unequal or oppressive relationships.

Valerie says… Isn’t the very act of our speaking out about the relationship between supervisor
and student—that relationship, which, by dint of its being kept discreetly invisible, and which by
its very taken-for-grantedness, becomes a discursive strategy reproducing existing educational
power structures, isn’t that breaking of silence a beginning...

Tom says… I keep returning to the "responsible use of power" as an overriding principle in my
relationships with others. But understanding what that means in each relationship can only be
achieved by making explicit the issues Valerie is brave enough to raise with me and which I am
willing to discuss. Doing both requires such commitment that I fear the time may come when
neither of us is willing to do either.
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